Risk sharing, investment, and incentives in the neoclassical growth model by Emilio Espino & Juan M. Sanchez
Economic Quarterly—Volume 96, Number 4—Fourth Quarter 2010—Pages 399–416
Risk Sharing, Investment,
and Incentives in the
Neoclassical Growth Model
Emilio Espino and Juan M. S´ anchez
T
he amount of risk sharing among households, regions, or countries
is crucial in determining aggregate welfare. For example, pooling
resources at the national level can help regions better deal with natural
disasters like ﬂoods. Similarly, pooling resources with an insurance company
can help individuals deal with shocks like a house ﬁre or a car accident.
Capitalaccumulationandeconomicgrowthalsoarecrucialindetermining
aggregate welfare. In particular, they determine the stock of wealth available
for consumption and investment. Importantly, wealthier households, regions,
or countries possess a buffer stock of precautionary assets, a form of self-
insurance.
These two important factors in determining welfare have interesting in-
teractions with one another. An important one is how insurance and savings
substitute for each other. For example, individuals may want to save more
when they do not have access to insurance than when they do because the
extra savings can protect against the consequences of an uninsured shock.
Therefore, capital accumulation and growth would be faster in an economy
without perfect insurance than in one with perfect insurance.
This article explores the tradeoffs between insurance and growth in the
neoclassical growth model with two agents and preference shocks. Most of
the analysis reviews the full information version of the model, where there are
no limits on insurance between the two agents, though there is still aggregate
uncertainty that affects aggregate savings behavior. Private information is
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Our article relates to the voluminous consumption/savings/capital accumu-
lation literature on two levels. On one hand, there has been a growing
literature focusing on the accumulation effects of demand side shocks in dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium models, following the pioneering work
ofBaxterandKing(1991)andHall(1997). Ingeneralequilibriummodels,de-
mand side shocks (such as preference shocks to consumption demand) have a
strongtendencytocrowdoutinvestment.1 Ontheotherhand,thereisliterature
on the impact of inequality on capital accumulation. If preferences aggregate
intheGormansense, thedistributionofwealthdoesnotaffecttheevolutionof
aggregate variables—see Chatterjee (1994) and Caselli and Ventura (2000).
In our setting, preferences do not aggregate in that strong sense. Thus, distri-
bution matters for aggregate savings and the corresponding dynamics of the
aggregate stock of capital.2
The literature analyzing economic growth and private information is not
as large, and the valuable contributions have relied on different simplifying
assumptions to make the analysis tractable. This article is related to those ar-
ticles because we are interested in understanding when information is (more)
important to implement the full information allocation. However, we solve
the full information model to obtain the full information allocation and char-
acterize only the incentives to misreport the shocks under that allocation.
Pioneering contributions in the literature on constrained efﬁcient alloca-
tions with private information abstracted from capital accumulation, as the
main goal was to study wealth distribution. In a pure exchange economy
setting, Green (1987) and Atkeson and Lucas (1992) show that (constrained)
efﬁcient allocations, independent of the feasibility technologies, display ex-
treme levels of “immiserization”: The expected utility level of (almost) every
agent in the economy converges to the lower bound with probability one.
This result is also present in Thomas and Worrall (1990). Then, in an early
contribution that includes capital accumulation, Marcet and Marimon (1992)
examine a two-agent model where a risk-neutral investor with unlimited re-
sources invests in the technology of a risk-averse producer whose output is
subject to privately observed productivity shocks. They show that the full
information investment policy can be implemented in the private information
1 See Wen (2006) for an overview and references therein.
2 See Lucas and Stokey (1984) for a general early discussion and, more recently, Sorger
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environment. That is, in their setting, a risk-neutral investor can make the
risk-averse entrepreneur follow the full information investment policy and al-
locate his consumption conditional on output realizations. Thus, they ﬁnd
that growth levels are as high as with perfect information. The key simpliﬁca-
tion in this article is that the second agent in the economy is risk-neutral with
unlimited resources.
Khan and Ravikumar (2001) extend Marcet and Marimon (1992) to im-
pose a period-by-period feasibility constraint and endogenous growth. In
particular, they examine the impact of incomplete risk sharing on growth and
welfare in the context of theAK model. The source of market incompleteness
is private information since household technologies are subject to idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks not observable by others. Risk sharing between
households occurs through contracts with intermediaries. This sort of incom-
plete risk sharing tends to reduce the rate of growth relative to the complete
risk-sharing benchmark. However, “numerical examples indicate that, on av-
erage, the growth and welfare effects on incomplete risk sharing are likely to
be small.” One key simpliﬁcation in this case is that the allocation solved is
not necessarily the best incentive-compatible allocation.
Recently, Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang (2010a) embedded the costly
stateveriﬁcationframeworkintothestandardgrowthmodel.3 Therelationship
between the ﬁrm and lender is modeled as a static contract. In the economy
in which information is too costly, undeserving ﬁrms are overﬁnanced and
deservingonesareunderfunded. Areductioninthecostofinformationleadsto
more capital accumulation and a redirection of funds away from unproductive
ﬁrms toward productive ones. Greenwood, Sanchez, andWang (2010b) show
that this mechanism has quantitative signiﬁcance to explain cross-country
differences in capital-to-income ratios and total factor productivity.
Otherstudiesusesimilarmodelsforotherpurposes. Espino(2005)studies
a neoclassical growth model that includes a discrete number of agents, like
the one presented in this article. However, he uses the economy with private
information about the preference shock to analyze the validity of Ramsey’s
conjecture about the long-run allocation of an economy in which agents are
heterogeneous in their discount factor. Clementi, Cooley, and Giannatale
(2010) study a repeated bilateral exchange model with hidden action, along
thelinesofSpearandSrivastava(1987)andWang(1997),thatincludescapital
accumulation. The two agents in the economy are a risk-neutral investor and
a risk-averse entrepreneur. They show that the incentive scheme chosen by
the investor provides a rationale for ﬁrm decline.
This article is organized as follows: Section 1 presents the physical envi-
ronmentandtheplanner’sproblem,andderivestheoptimalallocation. Section
3 See also Khan (2001) and Chakraborty and Lahiri (2007).402 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
2 describes the calibration and the numerical solution of the full informa-
tion allocation. Section 3 studies in which cases the full information alloca-
tion would be incentive compatible in an economy with private information.




consumption good that is represented by a standard neoclassical production
function, F(K,L), where K is the current stock of capital and L denotes
units of labor. There are two agents in the economy, h = 1,2. Agent h is
endowed with one unit of time each period and does not value leisure, i.e.,
the time endowment is supplied inelastically in the labor market. The initial
stock of capital at date 0 is denoted by K0 > 0. Capital depreciates at the rate
δ ∈ (0,1).
Atthebeginningofdatet, agent1facesanidiosyncraticpreferenceshock
st ∈ St ={ sL,s H}, where sH >s L. This shock is assumed to be i.i.d. across
time, whereπi > 0 istheprobabilityofsi, i = L,H. Noticethatst isalsothe
aggregate preference shock at date t. The aggregate history of shocks from
date 0 to date t, denoted st = (s0,...,st), has probability at date 0 given by
π(st) = π(s0)...π(st).
Given a consumption plan {c1,t}∞
t=0 such that c1,t : St → R+, agent 1’s













where u1 : R+ → R is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice differ-
entiable, lim
ct→0
u (ct) =+ ∞ , and β ∈ (0,1). Similarly, given {c2,t}∞
t=0, agent














Consider the problem of a ﬁctitious planner choosing the best feasible allo-
cation. Let K  ={ Kt+1}∞
t=0 be an investment plan that every period allocates
nextperiod’scapitalforallt. Similarly,letC ={ Ct}∞
t=0 beaconsumptionplan
where Ct = (c1t,c 2t).G i v e n K0, a sequential allocation (C,K ) is feasible
if, for all st,
Kt(st) + c1t(st) + c2t(st) ≤ F(K t(st−1),1) + (1 − δ)Kt(st−1).E. Espino and J. M. S´ anchez: Investment and Risk Sharing 403
We will assume throughout the article that the production function F is Cobb-
Douglas with exponent γ.
ThePareto-optimalallocationinthiseconomyisafeasibleallocationsuch
that there is no other feasible allocation that provides all the agents the same
ormorelifetimeutility. Onereasontobeinterestedintheseallocationsisthat,
under certain conditions, they are equivalent to competitive equilibrium allo-
cations. Under our assumptions, Pareto-optimal allocations can be obtained
by solving the following problem:
max
(C,K )
αU1(c1) + (1 − α)U2(c2)
subject to
K(st) + c1(st) + c2(st) ≤ F(K(st−1),1) + (1 − δ)K(st−1),∀st,
where K0 is given and α ∈ [0,1] is the weight that the planner assigned to
agent1—referredtohereafterasParetoweight. Noticethatdifferentvaluesof
α characterize different points in the Pareto frontier. Later, we will consider
a different allocation varying the value of α.
To characterize the problem further, it is simpler to consider the methods
developed by Lucas and Stokey (1984) to solve for Pareto-optimal allocations
in growing economies populated with many consumers. It is actually simple
toadapttheirmethodtoanalyzethiseconomy. Theideaistomakenextperiod
welfare weights conditional on the current shock.4




α {πL [u1(sL,c 1L)+βw1L]+πH [u1(sH,c 1H)+βw1H]}+
(1 − α){πL [u2(c2L) + βw2L] + πH [u2(c2H) + βw2H]} (1)
subject to
f (k) + (1 − δ)k ≥ k 
L + c1L + c2L, (2)
f (k) + (1 − δ)k ≥ k 
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H) − α 
Hw1H − (1 − α 
H)w2H ≥ 0, (5)
where α ={ α,1 − α} and w are the from-tomorrow-on utilities. The idea in
(1)–(5)istorepresenttheproblemofchoosinganoptimalallocationforagiven
stockofcapitalk andavectorofParetoweights(α,1−α)asoneofchoosinga
feasiblecurrentperiodallocationofconsumptionc ={ c1L,c 1H,c 2L,c 2H}and
capital goods k  ={ k 
L,k 
H}, and a vector of from-tomorrow-on utilities w =
4 See Beker and Espino (2011) for a discussion about the implementation and the correspond-
ing technical details.404 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
{w1L,w 1H,w 2L,w 2H},subjecttotheconstraintthattheseutilitiesbeattainable
given the capital accumulation decision, as guaranteed by constraints (4)–(5).
As in Lucas and Stokey (1984), the weights {α 
L,α 
H} that attain the minimum
in (4) and (5) will be the new weights used in selecting tomorrow’s allocation,
and so on, ad inﬁnitum.
Characterization













(1 − α)πL (c2L)
−σ = λL,
(1 − α)πH (c2H)
−σ = λH,
where λi is the Lagrange multiplier in the resource constraints in state i =
L,H. From these equations it is simple to obtain that the consumption of























1/σ + (1 − α)
1/σ CH. (6)
The FOC with respect to w are
απLβ = μLα 
L,
απHβ = μHα 
H,
(1 − α)πLβ = μL(1 − α 
L),
(1 − α)πHβ = μH(1 − α 
H).
These imply that
απLβ + (1 − α)πLβ = μLα 
L + μL(1 − α 
L),
and therefore πLβ = μL and πHβ = μH. Using the FOC with respect to w
again, these two conditions imply α = α 
L = α 
H. Thus, the Pareto weights
will be constant in this problem.E. Espino and J. M. S´ anchez: Investment and Risk Sharing 405
Using the fact that individual consumption is a share of aggregate con-
sumptionandthatParetoweightsareconstant,thisproblemcanberewrittenas
one solving for the consumption (or capital accumulation) of a representative
consumer with aggregate preference shocks. In that case, the state-dependent
utility of the representative consumer, uR, would be
uR(s,C) = (
 
sα)1/σ + (1 − α)1/σ σ C1−σ
1 − σ
.
Notice here that the level of the shock depends not just on the size of s,
but also on α. This representation is useful to understand that the optimal
investment decision is affected by the realization of the preference shock and
the distributional parameter α. When s is larger, the representative agent
prefers to increase consumption today and decrease investment. Given the
same shock, the size of the drop in investment depends on the Pareto weight
of the agent that received the shock.















An application of the envelope conditions makes these conditions imply the
standard Euler equations determining capital accumulation,
1 = (F  (k 
L) + (1 − δ))β
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1 = (F  (k 
H) + (1 − δ))β
 
πLsL(c 






determined. Most of the parameters are standard in the neoclassical growth
model and take standard values. Others, such as the size of the preference
shock and the probability of occurrence, were chosen only to illustrate the
behavior of the model. In particular, a high preference shock happens on
average every 6.7 years, but it is large enough to demand a signiﬁcant amount
ofresources. Think,forexample,thatacountryinaneconomicunionrequires
help or assistance on average every 6.7 years. Table 1 presents the values for
all the parameters of the model.
The right-hand side of (1)–(5) deﬁnes a contraction. The computation is
based on value function iteration as follows. Guess a function V. Then solve
formaxc,w ,k  usingV,theFOCdescribedabove,andnumericalmaximization.406 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 1 Parameter Values
Parameter Value
γ Exponent of capital in production function 0.30
δ Depreciation rate of capital 0.07
β Discount factor 0.97
σ Relative risk aversion 0.50
sL Low value of the preference shock 0.95
sH High value of the preference shock 1.05 and 2.00
πL Probability of low value of the preference shock 0.85
πH Probability of high value of the preference shock 0.15
With this solution, construct a new function V   and restart the maximization
unless V   is sufﬁciently close to V. Now we discuss the results using the
parameters in Table 1 with sH = 2 and Pareto weights {0.75,0.25}. Figure
1 presents time series for aggregate consumption and capital accumulation in
thesteadystateofthiseconomy. Onthetoppanelthataggregateconsumption
jumps after a preference shock and then returns slowly to a relatively constant
value until a new shock hits. As a consequence, capital accumulation drops
after a high preference shock to accommodate larger aggregate consumption,
as shown on the top panel. The effect of this change on the incentives to
misreport a shock—if it would be unobservable—is discussed in the next
section. The distribution of consumption among agents is determined by
equations (6), i.e., agent 1’s share of aggregate consumption increases with
the value of the shock. More on this later.
Figure 2 depicts the stationary distribution of the main variables for the
same example analyzed in Figure 1. The top left panel shows that 15 percent
of the time there is a large preference shock equal to 2 and most of the time
(85 percent) a low shock equal to 0.95. The top right panel presents the
stationary distribution of capital. It is somehow surprising that very different
values (e.g., 3 and 6) are reached with positive probability. Most of its mass is
accumulatedonthehighervalues, however. Thosecorrespondtoperiodswith
low preference shocks. The lowest values of capital correspond to periods
of several consecutive high preference shocks. Something similar happens
with c2, on the bottom right panel. A priori, these properties could have been
expected since k  and c2 are the two sources to ﬁnance transfers to agent 1
after a high preference shock. The distribution of c1, presented on the bottom
left panel, has most of the mass around lower values and some mass at higher
values. The highest values correspond to a high preference shock hitting the
economy after a long period of low shocks.E. Espino and J. M. S´ anchez: Investment and Risk Sharing 407

























Notes: These histograms were computed from time series data of these variables for
5,000 periods after deleting the ﬁrst 500 realizations.
3. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION
This section investigates the incentives to misreport preference shocks by
agent 1 whenever the full information allocation described above is the target
to be implemented. To do so, consider the value of the following (implicit)
incentive compatibility constraints:
iccHL = sHu(c1H) + βw1H − [sHu(c1L) + βw1L], (7)
iccLH = sLu(c1L) + βw1L − [sLu(c1H) + βw1H]. (8)
Theinterpretationofthesevariablesisveryimportantfortheanalysishereafter.
If the variable iccHLis positive, it means that when the state H realizes, agent
1 would prefer truthfully reporting a high preference shock and obtaining
{c1H,w 1H} instead of misreporting it and receiving {c1L,w 1L}. Similarly, a408 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 2 Stationary Distribution, Main Variables
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Notes: These histograms were computed from time series data of these variables for
5,000 periods after deleting the ﬁrst 500 realizations.
negative value of iccLH means that agent 1 would prefer misreporting a high
preferenceshockandobtaining{c1H,w 1H}totruthfullyreportingalowshock
and receiving {c1L,w 1L}.
Sincec1H >c 1L,onemayexpectthatthereisnoincentivetoreportthelow
shockwhenthehighshockwasactuallyrealized,i.e.,apositivevalueoficcHL.
This is actually what happens in the stationary distribution, as shown on the
top panel of Figure 3. In contrast, agent 1 may be tempted to misreport a high
preference shock to obtain higher consumption. Remember that this would
imply that iccLH < 0. This does not need to always be the case, however.
Sincek  islowerafterahighpreferenceshock,agent1’sprospectsworsenafter
a high preference shock. Thus, it will be a race between more consumption
today, c1H >c 1L, and less future consumption, w1L >w 1H. The results forE. Espino and J. M. S´ anchez: Investment and Risk Sharing 409
Figure 3 Incentive Compatibility in the Stationary Distribution
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Notes: These histograms were computed from time series data of these variables for
5,000 periods after deleting the ﬁrst 500 realizations.
the example described above are presented in the bottom panel of Figure 3.
There, iccLH is negative more than 80 percent of the time but positive in some
instances. Thismeansthatinallsuchinstances,thedropinfrom-tomorrow-on
utilities caused by reporting a high preference shock is enough to compensate
for the difference in current consumption. What determines whether iccLH is
negative or positive will be studied next by analyzing different examples.
The next two examples capture the role of the size of redistribution versus
disinvestment. The ﬁrst example is presented in Figure 4. This is the same
example in all the previous ﬁgures, but the difference is that the Pareto weight
of agent 1 is only 0.33 (instead of 0.75) and the weight of agent 2 is 0.67. This
implies that agent 2’s consumption is larger, as shown in the top left panel.
The top right panel presents the behavior of capital accumulation. Notice that410 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly




















































Notes: In this economy, the weights on agents 1 and 2 are 0.33 and 0.67, respectively.
The time series data in all four graphs correspond to the initial 35 periods after the
economy is started with a stock of capital smaller than the steady-state level.
the time series in the graphs correspond to the transition toward a higher level
of capital. From these two ﬁgures it is clear that a nontrivial part of the rise in
agent1’sconsumptionafterahighpreferenceshockcomesfromredistribution
of consumption across agents. As a consequence, the promised utilities from
next period on are not that different after a report of high or low preference
shock, as shown in the bottom left panel. In turn, this implies that iccLH
is always negative, as presented in the right bottom panel. Thus, this is an
example in which the full information allocation would not be implementable
under private information: After a low preference shock, agent 1 would prefer
to falsely report a high preference shock.E. Espino and J. M. S´ anchez: Investment and Risk Sharing 411





































Notes: In this economy, the weights on agents 1 and 2 are 0.85 and 0.15, respectively.
The time series artiﬁcial data in all four graphs correspond to 30 periods created after
the steady-state level of capital is reached.
Now consider the example presented in Figure 5. Here, the behavior of
the same series is presented for an economy in which the Pareto weight of
agent 1 is 0.85 and the steady-state distribution of capital is reached. This
implies that agent 1’s consumption is much larger than that of agent 2, as
shown in the top left panel. As a consequence, capital accumulation must
vary signiﬁcantly to provide more consumption to agent 1 after the realization
of a high preference shock. This is shown in the top right panel. Therefore,
as presented in the bottom left panel, the difference in from-tomorrow-on
utilities associated with low and high preference shocks is large. Thus, both
incentive compatibility constraints are positive in the stationary distribution412 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly









































Notes: In this economy, the weights on agents 1 and 2 are 0.75 and 0.25, respectively.
The time series data in all four graphs correspond to the initial 35 periods after the
economy is started with a stock of capital larger than the steady-state level.
of this economy (see bottom right panel), and the full information allocation
would be implementable under private information.
The previous two examples are useful to understand that the relative im-
portance of the agent who privately observes the shock matters for the role of
privateinformation. Whenthisagentismoreimportant,hershareofaggregate
consumption is larger, and the rise of that agent’s consumption after a shock
comes mainly from disinvestment. This makes misreporting a high prefer-
ence shock too costly in terms of her own future consumption, and hence the
full information allocation is implementable under private information. Thus,
the size of disinvestment, determined by the importance of the agent with
the preference shock, matters for the provision of incentives under privateE. Espino and J. M. S´ anchez: Investment and Risk Sharing 413
information. This suggests that in a fully speciﬁed model with private infor-
mation, the planner would like to increase the Pareto weight of the agent with
private information to reduce the incidence of this friction.
The next example illustrates the role of the outlook for economic growth
at the time of disinvestment in preventing misrepresentation of preference
shocks. First, consider the example in Figure 6. It displays the transition to
the steady state from a larger stock of capital. The weights of agents 1 and
2 are 0.75 and 0.25, respectively. Initially, consumption, capital, and from-
tomorrow-onutilitiesdecrease. Duringthisinitialphase, whilecapitalislarge
and decreasing, iccLH is negative and increasing. This means that when there
is extra capital in the economy, as compared to the stationary distribution,
the optimal drop in capital that a high preference shock would require (and
its corresponding drop in promised utility) is not large enough to provide
incentives to make the report of that shock incentive compatible. Eventually,
a high preference shock hits the economy, the consumption of agent 1 jumps,
and capital drops signiﬁcantly. Now, the economy is expected to grow in
the coming years, which implies that another high preference shock would
hurt both agents more. Therefore, reporting a high preference shock becomes
incentivecompatibleforafewyears, untilthestockofcapitalreachesahigher
level. The same story occurs again in a few years, when a high preference
shock hits the economy again. Thus, this example illustrates the interaction
of growth and information. Misrepresentation of preference shocks is more
costlyiftheeconomyisexpectedtogrow. Thisﬁndingsuggeststhataplanner
solving for the best incentive-compatible allocation would delay growth to
facilitate the provision of incentives.
The last example conﬁrms the importance of the size of disinvestment
and the outlook for economic growth. Consider the time series artiﬁcial data
presented in Figure 7. The Pareto weight for agent 1 is larger than in previous
examples, 0.85, but the value of the high preference shock is smaller, sH =
1.05. First, notice that this example conﬁrms the result in the previous ﬁgure:
Itiseasiertoprovideincentives(iccLH islarger)whentheeconomyisexpected
to grow. However, in this case, iccLH is never greater than zero. Notice that
this happens despite agent 1’s weight being larger than in all other examples.
The key difference is that the shock is not that large. Thus, the size of the
drop in capital accumulation is not very relevant, and therefore the difference
between w1L and w2L is small.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This article studies the interaction between growth and risk sharing. First, it
answers how investment is affected by insurance needs. A stochastic growth
model with two agents and preference shocks is used to answer this question.
Onlyoneoftheagents(orgroups,regions,countries)isaffectedbythisshock,414 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly





























Notes: In this economy, the weights on agents 1 and 2 are 0.85 and 0.15, respectively.
The time series artiﬁcial data in all four graphs correspond to 30 periods created after
the steady-state level of capital is reached.
which basically increases the need of consumption for this agent. When both
agents are risk-averse, the socially optimal response to this shock requires
both decreasing the consumption of other agents and decreasing capital ac-
cumulation. Thus, the occurrence of this shock slows down the convergence
toward the stationary distribution of capital.
Then,weanalyzeifthebestpathofcapitalaccumulationandconsumption
allocationisimplementableifneedsareprivatelyobservedbytheagents. That
is, if the shocks are privately observed by individuals, do they have incentive
to misrepresent? The value of the incentive compatibility constraints implied
by the full information allocation is used to answer this question. Because
investmentdropswhenanagentreportsahighpreferenceshock,theprospectsE. Espino and J. M. S´ anchez: Investment and Risk Sharing 415
of all agents deteriorate after such a report. This may be enough to prevent
misreporting. The size of disinvestment after the report of a high preference
shock and the outlook for economic growth at the time of disinvestment are
important to induce individuals to report a low realization of the preference
shock truthfully. This analysis suggests that in a fully speciﬁed model with
privateinformation,thebestincentivecompatibleallocationwouldtendtohurt
growth, by decreasing investment, and increase inequality, by augmenting the
share of consumption of the agent with private information. Of course, this
is only a conjecture. Solving for the constrained-efﬁcient allocation in this
environment is necessary to verify the validity of this conjecture. This is left
for future research.
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